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Abstract. 
This paper shows that the field of migration management features a politics of expertise 
through which migration is enacted as a reality that can be managed because it can be 
precisely quantified. For instance, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
maintains a “Global Migration Flows Interactive App”. This interactive map suggests that the 
number of people migrating from country A to B can be exactly known at any point in time. 
This enactment of migration sits in contrast with the widely acknowledged unreliability and 
non-coherence of migration statistics. This paper investigates how this tension is negotiated 
through the production of “strategic ignorance” (McGoey) about the known limits of 
quantifying migration. Drawing on work from ignorance studies we highlight four practices 
producing strategic ignorance: (1) omission of the significant gap between recorded 
immigration and emigration events; (2) compression of different accounts of migration into 
one “world migration map”; (3) deflection of knowledge about the specifities of different 
methods to production sites of statistical data; and (4) usage of metadata for sanitizing the 
statistical production process of any messy aspects. Our analysis shows that the politics of 
expertise in the field of migration management are intertwined with a politics of ignorance. 
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Introduction 
In April 2011 David Cameron, the then prime minister of the United Kingdom (UK), 
promised that his government would reduce net-migration to the UK to the “tens of thousands 
each year”, down from an estimated 252,000 in 2010 (Migrationobservatory, 2012). While 
these strict net-migration targets have been criticized as difficult to implement, they have, to 
date, not been abandoned by the UK government. Unsurprisingly, the setting of net-migration 
targets has increased public interest in migration statistics published by the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS). A year after Cameron’s speech, the International Passenger Survey 
(IPS), the principal method for producing migration statistics in the UK, became a 
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controversy.3 According to 2011 census results, the population size of England and Wales 
was 464,000 people larger than the population size previously published by ONS. An 
investigation concluded that the most likely “largest single cause” for the divergence was 
“substantial underestimation of immigration from EU8 countries [in Central and Eastern 
Europe…] in the middle part of the decade” (ONS 2012, 10). Subsequently, a debate emerged 
whether the IPS was “fit for purpose” (ONS, 2014). A report by the Migration Observatory 
(2012) concludes “efforts to meet the government’s [migration] target lack, for the time being 
at least, an adequate measure of success.”  
 
What this example illustrates is the known unreliability and non-coherence of migration 
statistics (de Beer et al., 2010; Fassmann, 2009; Herm and Poulain, 2012; Wisniowski et al., 
2013). The latter sits in contrast with the influential representation of migration as an easily 
measurable, intelligible reality. An important example of this representation is the Global 
Migration Flows Interactive App (GMFIA) of the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM). The GMFIA was launched in 2016 as a “migration visualization tool” which “tracks 
migrants around the world.”4 It has a prominent position on IOM’s homepage, where it can be 
accessed under the tab “migration”. The tool also has a prominent position on the internet; it 
appears as the first link to any online search for “world migration.” When clicked on a 
particular country, the quantity and composition of in- and outward migration to or from that 
country appears on the screen. If clicked on inward migration to the UK, a circle of colored 
clusters emerges, each cluster visualizing the number of immigrants from another country (see 
Figure 1). If hovered over one of the colored clusters, the respective country of origin gets 
highlighted in the same color, and the number of immigrants from that country is displayed. 
The circles show, for instance, that 703,050 migrants from Poland and 9,361 migrants from 
Estonia reside in the UK. 
 
What the GMFIA and similar migration visualization tools demonstrate is that the 
field of migration management features a politics of ignorance in regards to the known limits 
of quantifying migration. Combing contributions from ignorance studies (Gross and McGoey, 
2015) with work on the performativity of methods in science and technology studies (STS), 
we argue that the GMFIA does not just represent an external reality called “world migration.” 
We rather understand this “visualization tool” as a digital device that helps to enact migration 
in the world as a reality in a particular way (Law, 2008; Mol, 2002; Ruppert et al., 2013). 
More precisely, the GMFIA enacts migration – through the provision of seemingly accurate, 
coherent figures – as a reality that can be managed because it can be precisely known and 
quantified. But this enactment is only possible through the production of “strategic 
unknowns” (McGoey, 2012a) about the known limits of quantifying migration. As such, the 
GMFIA supports the IOM’s agenda which has been promoting the paradigm of migration 
management since the 1980s.  
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Figure 1: Global Migration Flows Interactive App 
 
Source: Screenshot taken by the authors. https://www.iom.int/world-migration (Accessed 09 
October 2017) 
 
The IOM describes itself as an international organization that promotes “humane and 
orderly migration” in a way that “benefits migrants and society.”5 It has been repeatedly 
demonstrated, however, that the IOM’s activities aim at the regulation of migratory flows 
according to the interests of nation-state governments which fund most of the IOM’s activities 
(Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010; Ashutosh and Mountz, 2011; Georgi, 2010; Pecoud, 2017). 
Importantly, the paradigm of migration management fuels – in tandem with the turn towards 
evidence-based policy-making – a quest for more and better knowledge on migration, 
especially in terms of its quantification (Boswell, 2009; Geiger and Pécoud, 2010). The 
migration management paradigm contributes to this shift because it renders the government of 
migration as a question of expert knowledge (Andrijasevic and Walters, 2010).   
Quantification practices like migration statistics play, in turn, a key role in the 
demonstration of expertise due to the authoritative power of numbers which imbue their 
producers with the aura of scientific exactitude (Espeland and Stevens, 2008; Hansen, 2015; 
Hansen and Porter, 2012; Porter, 1995; Takle, 2017). This explains why many actors in the 
field of migration management have become keen producers of numerical facts. The annual 
Risk Analyses of the European border agency FRONTEX, the IOM’s annual World Migration 
Reports and the Global Appeal Reports by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) all build their narratives around figures, tables and charts. The 
representation of migration as a series of numerical facts serves a twofold purpose. First, it 
allows agencies like the IOM to present themselves as competent actors with the expertise to 
deliver projects of migration management. Second, the numbers circulated in reports, press 
releases and visualizations like the GMFIA enact migration as a single, coherent and therefore 
knowable and manageable reality, thus reproducing one of the very doxa of the field of 
migration management. Our analysis of the GMFIA supports, however, an alternative 
enactment of migration as a ghostly and slippery reality that defies attempts to quantify it.  
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The article’s contribution is twofold: First, it advances the enactment agenda in STS, 
which studies how knowledge practices perform the realities they allegedly only study and 
describe, by highlighting the important role that the production of ignorance plays in the 
enactment of realities. In line with recent contributions to ignorance studies, the article thus 
underscores the productive nature of ignorance and nonknowledge (Aradau, 2017; Gross, 
2012, 2016; Gross and McGoey, 2015; McGoey, 2012a). Building on the work of McGoey 
(2012b) on strategic ignorance, the article contributes, secondly, to ignorance studies by 
outlining four specific practices through which strategic unknowns are produced. 
In the following we develop these arguments by tracing the data that informs the 
GMFIA back to its sites of production. To concentrate the analysis on just one visualisation 
tool with a global scope allows us to study in detail how ‘strategic unknowns’ (McGoey, 
2012a) about the known limits of quantifying migration are produced in context of the 
GMFIA. Although there are numerous other visualization tools, like those to be found on the 
IOM’s Migration Data Portal or UNHCR’s Interactive Dataviz, we chose the GMFIA for the 
following reasons: First, it is directed to a wider public. Secondly, the GMFIA combines the 
authority of numbers with the persuasive power of maps to enact migration as a coherent, 
manageable reality. Finally, we focus on the GMFIA because its host, the IOM, is currently 
the most important actor in the field of migration management, which we understand with 
Pierre Bourdieu as a field of struggle in which various think tanks, border agencies, 
international and non-government organisations (NGOs) compete over influence, funding and 
agendas (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).6 
The data we build our argument on come from a research project that studies efforts to 
harmonize and innovate population statistics in Europe amidst methodological changes in 
light of technological and political developments. We have conducted a multi-sited, 
collaborative ethnography in which we have studied the working practices of statisticians, 
data scientists and other stakeholders through interviews, participant observations, the 
organization of collaborative workshops and analysis of documents, reports and statistical 
manuals. The following analysis focuses particularly on the production of migration statistics 
at four national statistical institutes (NSIs): the Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (CSB 
Latvia), ONS, Statistics Estonia (SE) and the National Statistical Institute of Turkey 
(Turkstat). Methodologically, the focus on members of the European Statistical System (ESS) 
makes sense because the ESS resembles a “hard case” insofar as it is regarded as one of the 
most advanced, harmonized and robust statistical systems in the world (Singleton, 2016; 
Takle, 2017).7  
After outlining our understanding of the relationship between expertise, knowledge 
and ignorance, we elaborate on four different practices that are mobilized for producing 
strategic ignorance. The second section illustrates how the known divergence between 
reported emigration and immigration events is ignored in the GMFIA through a practice we 
call omission. In the third section we look at the compression of different accounts of 
migration into one “world migration map” and the deflection of knowledge about the 
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specificities of different methods. In the fourth section, we show that metadata reports 
constitute key sites for the production of ignorance as they are used to sanitize the statistical 
production process of any messy moments. 
 
The politics of expertise and the strategic production of 
ignorance 
The demonstration of expertise, understood as highly technical, specialized 
knowledge, plays a central role in the competition over authority, funding and influence in the 
field of migration management (Boswell, 2009: 7). The central role assigned to expertise is 
not surprising given that in any policy field, governance is “inherently bound up with 
knowledge claims about that which is to be governed” (Sending, 2015: 8). In The Political 
Uses of Expert Knowledge, Christina Boswell writes, organizations like the IOM are 
“fundamentally concerned to secure legitimacy from relevant actors in their environment” 
(2009: 11). However, the primary aim of the quest for expertise is not necessarily improving 
the outputs of migration policy. Rather, organizations produce and display expert knowledge 
to increase their legitimacy and bolster their “claim to resources or jurisdiction over particular 
policy areas” (Boswell 2009, 7). In Bourdieusian terms, expertise resembles a form of cultural 
capital that may allow an actor to attain the status of an “epistemic authority” in a given field. 
An epistemic authority has the capacity to shape agendas and attract funding in that field “by 
virtue of possessing theoretical knowledge [and] being [regarded as] a reliable source of 
information or a skillful practitioner of a certain craft” (Geuss, 2001: 38). Importantly, 
expertise is not a fixed attribute of an organization. Instead, organizations like the IOM need 
to constantly perform themselves as knowledgeable, competent actors through publication of 
reports and studies, maintenance of research units, digital devices like the GMFIA and other 
knowledge practices. For expertise is a product of politics and culture and therefore context-
specific and mutable (Jasanoff, 2003: 159). 
To perform themselves as competent and showcase their expertise, many actors in the 
field of migration management engage in quantification practices thanks to the authority 
granted to numerical facts and their producers. Migration statistics belong to the “numerical 
operations” that promise to make certain aspects of social life – in this case migration – 
“transparent and governable” (Hansen, 2015: 204). Hence, “[a] shift to numbers implies […] 
a shift towards accuracy and truth, and this plays an important role in the legitimation and 
control of power” (Hansen and Porter, 2012: 415). The mobilization of numerical facts as a 
source of expertise is intensified by recent calls for “strengthening evidence-based policy 
making” in the field of migration management through more and better statistics on migration 
(e.g. ICMPD, 2013). These calls have intensified in context of the availability of 
unprecedented quantities of digital data due to the introduction of innovative surveillance and 
information technologies for purposes of border and migration management, such as 
biometric databases, or satellites and UAVs for the monitoring of borders (Tazzioli, 2016). 
They have also received a boost by the promise to produce more reliable and timely migration 
statistics with new methodologies based on various types of big data such as Google searches 
or mobile positioning data (Scheel and Ustek-Spilda, 2018). 
In general, numbers and statistics, and the colorful charts and neat tables in which they 
are presented, resemble veritable “technologies of truth production” (Urla, 1993: 819). They 
endow otherwise diffuse social processes like migration with the quality of quantifiable 
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objectivity by constituting them as countable ‘matters of fact’. One important source of the 
“quantitative authority” numbers is the influential epistemology of “metrological realism” 
(Espeland and Stevens, 2008: 417). Following this epistemological register, statistics measure 
objects that exist independently of the practices used to quantify them. Thus, the reality-status 
of abstract and often diffuse social processes (e.g. migration) “[are] presumed to be as 
permanent and real as any physical object” (ibid). Consequently, a presumed external reality 
becomes the yardstick for the accuracy, precision and reliability of statistics that are 
conceived of as measurements (Desrosières, 2001). In short, metrological realism confirms 
the central assumptions of “Euro-American common sense realism” which presumes a 
definite, singular and coherent reality “out there [that] substantially precedes our actions and 
attempts to know it” (Law, 2012: 156). This reality effect of metrological realism is 
particularly powerful when the authority of numbers is combined with the persuasive power 
of maps. For maps like the GMFIA suggest, precisely because they promise a total “God’s 
eye-view” on the world that “represents ‘the real’” (Pickles, 2004: 13), a complete and all-
encompassing knowledge, in this instance, of “migration in the world.” Hence, metrological 
realism resembles an epistemic cornerstone of migration management that allows its 
advocates to promote their policy recipes as universal ‘solutions’ which can be applied in any 
context. As such, methodological realism helps to legitimize catch-all-policies and to 
marginalize alternative policy options.    
To challenge this common-sense realism and its political implications, we adopt a 
constructivist approach that understands statistical practices as performative. Drawing on 
STS-scholarship on the concept of enactment (Law, 2004; Mol, 2002), we argue that 
quantification practices like statistics do not just count or measure a reality that exists out 
there. Rather, they help enact the object they set out to measure as an intelligible reality. 
Likewise, critical cartographers have demonstrated that “maps do not just represent space and 
place, but create them” (Cidell, 2008: 1208; see also: Pickles, 2004; Wood, 1993). Due to 
their performative effects, maps – especially those produced for popular consumption – 
embody and promote the interests of their producers (Wood, 1993). Importantly, the 
conception of quantification and other knowledge practices as performative opens up a 
political space that concerns the enactment of the real, a space Annemarie Mol calls 
“ontological politics” (2002). If realities do not exist outside the time and place of specific 
practices that enact them, then different practices enact different versions of the real (Law, 
2009: 242). This calls for an “empirical ontology” which attends to the specifities of practices 
and particularities of realities (Law and Lien, 2012). Moreover, if we start from the idea that 
different quantification practices enact different versions of the real, then the enactment of 
migration as a single, coherent reality by visualizations like the GMFIA ceases to be an 
expected, self-evident outcome. It rather becomes an accomplishment that hinges on the 
production of strategic ignorance about the known limits of quantifying migration.  
By highlighting the importance of ignorance, this article seeks to advance the 
enactment agenda, which has so far mostly focused on knowledge and representational 
practices in the doing of realities. Less attention has been paid to the role of ignorance and 
nonknowledge in the enactment of realities. To illustrate this point we draw on contributions 
to ignorance studies which investigate ignorance and nonknowledge as “regular” rather than 
“deviant” or exceptional features of knowledge production and decision-making (Gross and 
McGoey, 2015: 4). Yet, to date these discussions lack a coherent, agreed-upon nomenclature 
(Smithson, 2008). While some scholars use ignorance and nonknowledge interchangeably 
(e.g. Kleinman and Suryanarayanan, 2013: 495), others distinguish between the two (e.g. 
Gross, 2012) or develop taxonomies of different types of ignorance and nonknowledge (e.g. 
Aradau, 2017; Beck and Wehling, 2012; Gross, 2016). As the name of the scholarly field 
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suggests, ignorance has gained acceptance as the overarching term. Ulrich Beck and Peter 
Wehling (2012: 53) note, however, that ignorance carries negative connotations and related 
moral judgments in the sense of active disregard. Therefore, they prefer to speak of 
nonknowledge. Furthermore, Claudia Aradau (2017: 332) argues that “the very use of 
‘ignorance’ as an overarching term risks limiting attention to how different modes of 
nonknowledge are enacted […]”, as the focus is on what has been ignored rather than how 
and why. Following Aradau, we thus understand ignorance as a particular type of 
nonknowledge that is actively produced as it involves the obfuscation or suppression of 
otherwise available knowledge. Hence, while nonknowledge refers to various forms and states 
of not-knowing, including those resulting from an incapacity to know, we reserve the term 
ignorance for actively generated forms of nonknowledge. 
However, in order to avoid allusions to any “conspirational logic”, which Scott Frickel 
and Michelle Edwards (2014: 216) identify in earlier works in ignorance studies, we build on 
Lindsey McGoey’s (2012b) notion of “strategic ignorance”. McGoey emphasizes that 
ignorance is productive and not just the negative side of knowledge. She shows that actors 
may actively try to nurture and preserve ignorance to use it as a resource to advance their 
interests be it in claiming more funding, denial of responsibility or assertion of expertise (ibid, 
555). Importantly, McGoey emphasizes that such a production and use of ignorance may be 
strategic and deliberate, but not necessarily conscious. Rather, the production of strategic 
ignorance may be tacit and distributed, when, for instance, it would be more advantageous to 
avoid troubling knowledge, in the face of social taboos or organizational and professional 
pressures (ibid, 557, 559).  
To emphasize McGoey’s stance that strategic ignorance is not necessarily the outcome 
of a conscious, orchestrated plan, and to retain a safe distance from conspiracy theories, we 
show that the production of strategic ignorance can also result from the non-transfer of 
knowledge from one epistemic community to another (Schiebinger, 2005). This non-transfer 
may result from the fact that different professional or intellectual fields of practice deploy – 
and are partly defined through – distinct epistemic forms, understood as “the suite of 
concepts, methods, measures and interpretations that shapes the ways in which actors produce 
knowledge and ignorance in their professional/ intellectual fields of practice” (Kleinman and 
Suryanarayanan, 2013: 492). This is why different fields of practice may develop distinct 
“epistemic cultures of nonknowledge” over time (Böschen et al., 2010). One crucial source 
for non-transfer of knowledge between different fields of practice is data friction – the 
moments of distortion, reinterpretation and loss that may occur when “data move between 
people, substrates, organizations, or machines” (Edwards et al., 2011: 669). 
In the remainder of this article, we look at the GMFIA to show how the production of 
ignorance features in the enactment of migration as a precisely quantifiable reality. Our 
analysis allows us to advance McGoey’s work on strategic ignorance by showing how 
strategic unknowns are produced through four distinct practices: omitting, compressing, 
deflecting and sanitizing. Furthermore, our conceptual framework permits us to illustrate that 
this production of ignorance is strategic in a twofold sense: First, it helps to secure the doxa of 
the field of migration management, namely the belief that migration is something that can be 
ordered and managed according to certain policy objectives.8 Second, individual actors in the 
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field of migration management produce strategic unknowns about the known limits of 
quantifying migration to increase the legitimacy and force of their expertise in order to 
improve their relative position in the field. 
 
Entries, exits and unknowns 
Inconsistencies between the numbers of migrants reported by different countries is a known 
issue in migration statistics. In theory, each emigration event from a country should 
correspond to an immigration event in the receiving country. This is reflected in the 1998 
United Nations Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration where an 
international migrant is defined as 
 
“a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for 
a period of at least a year (12 months), so that the country of residence effectively 
becomes his or her new country of usual residence. From the perspective of the 
country of departure, the person will be a long-term emigrant and from that of the 
country of arrival, the person will be a long-term immigrant” (see also: UNECE, 
2015: 137; UNSD, 1998: 10). 
 Yet, in practice “emigration numbers reported by sending countries tend to differ 
from the corresponding immigration numbers reported by receiving countries” (de Beer et al., 
2010: 459; cf. UNECE, 2014). According to Eurostat figures, the UK reported for example 
42,403 immigrants from Poland in 2015, while Poland reported only sending 11,682 
emigrants to the UK.9 Generally, figures on emigration tend to be lower than reported 
immigration events in receiving countries (UNECE, 2008) as individuals usually have little 
incentive to inform authorities about their departure, while there may be some benefits for 
informing authorities in a destination country about one’s arrival. 
However, any mismatches between recorded immigration and emigration events are 
bracketed out in the GMFIA. If one compares the recorded emigration events of a given 
country, like Latvia, with the recorded immigration events of the corresponding destination 
country, like the UK, the numbers match perfectly on the GMFIA: 66,046 people.10 Hence, 
the GMFIA simply omits this known weakness of migration statistics by providing perfectly 
matching figures for emigration and immigration. This raises the question how this perfect 
correspondence is achieved. 
Regarding the origin of the data informing the visualization, the GMFIA provides only 
scarce information to users. Only if they follow a link to an external webpage, users might 
find out that the data were taken from the 2015 edition of a database on Trends in 
International Migrant Stock by the United Nations’ Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (UNDESA). Here, the crucial point is that the UN database only provides data on 
stocks of immigrants in a given country and that the data have simply been equated in the 
GMFIA with the number of emigration events in corresponding countries of origin. Through 
this equivalence the known inconsistencies between reported emigration and immigration 
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events are omitted with the effect that migration is enacted as a single, coherent and precisely 
measurable reality. 
One reason that may justify this omission is that data on immigration events in 
receiving countries are usually regarded as “more reliable” than data on emigration events in 
sending countries (Fieldwork Notes, Statistics Norway, April 2017; see also: UNECE & 
Eurostat, 2010: 7). However, “receiving country data should not always be considered better 
than sending country data” (de Beer et al., 2010: 471). Hence, the creation of an equivalence 
between recorded immigration and emigration events by using the former as a stand-in for the 
latter is methodologically questionable.  
As noted in the introduction, ONS had to revise both the population size of the UK 
and migration statistics after the 2011 census after it had diagnosed “a substantial 
underestimation” of immigration from eight new EU member states in its migration statistics 
preceding the census. Another country that revised its migration figures after the 2011 census 
was Latvia, one of the eight countries of origin identified by ONS as a source for the 
“significant underestimation” of immigration to the UK. In Latvia the 2011 census results 
indicated a population size that was 155,000 or 7 percent smaller than the previously 
published population size based on the cohort component method (CSB Latvia, 2015). The 
latter adjusts the population size of the previous census on an annual basis by recorded births, 
deaths and net migration figures. An analysis of the divergence cites “unregistered 
emigration” as the main reason for this discrepancy (ibid, 3). While the UK is considered an 
important destination country of Latvian emigrants, the exact number of Latvians living in the 
UK remains unknown. Since the IPS, the principal method for migration statistics in the UK, 
extrapolates the number of immigrants from a particular country from a small number of 
migrants identified at the border, “it can only produce estimates with margins of error rather 
than pinpoint numbers” (Migrationobservatory, 2011: 4). Hence, statisticians resorted to a 
different data source to assess how many Latvians had emigrated to the UK through so-called 
“mirror statistics” on recorded immigration events in the UK: the number of national 
insurance numbers that have been allocated to Latvian citizens in the UK in the reference year 
(interview CSB Latvia, October 2016). Nevertheless, these data can “only be used to evaluate 
the general trend” because national insurance numbers are also given to people staying less 
than one year (CSB Latvia, 2015: 7). Consequently, this method is haunted by a similar 
problem of unregistered emigration, since immigrants may also re-emigrate (either to another 
country or their country of origin) without notifying authorities in the UK. Thus, “the mirror 
[recorded immigration events] reflects biased images [of emigration events in countries of 
origin]”, as a statistician of Eurostat put it in a presentation on migration statistics (Fieldwork 
notes, Conference of European Statisticians in Paris, April 2014). 
What these examples demonstrate is that the establishment of an equivalence between 
recorded immigration events in a receiving country and recorded emigration events in a 
corresponding sending country is based on the methodologically questionable omission of the 
known incoherence between the two. While the IOM’s GMFIA suggests that the number of 
Latvian immigrants in the UK can be quantified precisely, the difficulties of ONS and CSB 
Latvia to provide a reliable estimate of this migration flow indicate that the exact number of 
Latvian migrants living in the UK is not known by statistical authorities. Ultimately, 
migration emerges as a “slippery” (Law and Lien, 2012) and “ghostly”, indeed “more-than-
single” reality (Walters, 2014: 103) that regularly defies and escapes statisticians’ attempts to 
quantify it. 
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Multiple methods, different numbers, single migration reality? 
If users of the GMFIA trace back the origin of the data informing the IOM’s “migration 
visualization tool” they will learn from the documentation on the UN webpage that data from 
various sources have been combined in the dataset, including censuses, surveys and 
administrative registers (UNDESA 2015, 7). Yet, this cannot be done without ignoring 
important methodological specificities. Ignoring methodological heterogeneity is necessary 
because the usage of different definitions, methods and data sources makes comparison of 
migration data “difficult and confusing” (Wisniowski et al. 2013, 460). This concerns both 
spatial comparisons between countries and temporal comparisons in the migration time series 
of one country (Herm and Poulain, 2012). Consequently, the GMFIA’s representation of 
“world migration” as a series of precise, stable and comparable figures emerges as an 
accomplishment. In the following we show how different versions of migration are negotiated 
at SE before attending to how the GMFIA deflects knowledge about the heterogeneity of 
statistical methods. 
According to the GMFIA, Estonia hosts 202,348 immigrants. If we hover over the 
colored circles which visualize the composition of Estonia’s immigrant population we learn 
that 143,677 people from Russia, 1,271 people from Germany, 1 person from Sudan, and 13 
people from Nigeria reside in Estonia. Through the provision of these very exact figures 
migration appears as something that can be precisely quantified.  
Yet, this account of migration requires that multiple efforts and methodological 
changes to quantify migration are ignored. In 2013, SE reported 6,740 emigrants and 4,098 
immigrants and in 2014, 4,637 emigrants and 3,904 immigrants (SE, 2015).11 In 2015, 
however, 15,413 immigrants and 13,003 emigrants were reported –  an increase of nearly 400 
percent in immigration and 300 percent in emigration. In press releases, Estonian statisticians 
attributed this  ‘jump’ to a change in methodology (SE, 2016a, 2016b). Until 2016, SE mainly 
relied on recorded migration events in the Estonian population register (RR). However, the 
low number of reported migration events were increasingly regarded as implausible by 
statisticians as well as policy makers and demographers (interview SE, December 2015).  
Statisticians cited unreliable RR data as the principal reason for the low figures. Many 
individuals would simply not notify authorities about their departures. Furthermore, 
statisticians pointed out an issue with the computer software used for producing migration 
statistics. The software required statisticians to enter a person’s previous country of usual 
residence to include that person in the immigrant population. While introduced with the 
intention of obtaining as much detailed information on the immigrant/emigrant population as 
possible, this requirement produced a significant “undercount” of immigration from EU 
member states (two interviews SE, March 2016). 
Hence, statisticians developed a new method, the residency index (RI), for the 
production of migration statistics. The RI is based on a relatively simple idea. If a person with 
a record in the RR does actually live in Estonia, it is assumed she will engage in more 
transactions with government institutions than a person who does not reside in the country. 
These transactions will leave traces behind (so-called “signs of life”) in various administrative 
registers (Tiit and Maasing, 2016). To illustrate, if a person studies in Estonia, she will have a 
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 Figures retrieved from SE’s statistical database: http://pub.stat.ee/px-
web.2001/Dialog/Saveshow.asp (Accessed on 29 September 2017). 
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record in the education register. If she is employed, she will pay taxes. If she is retired, she 
will receive a pension and so forth. Thanks to the unique personal identification number that 
is used across all administrative registers, Estonian statisticians can link data from 14 different 
registers to calculate a residency index for each person with a record in the RR. The value of a 
person’s residency index ranges between 0 and 1, depending on the number of the signs of life 
she accumulates across all government registers in a given year. The higher the value of the 
index, the higher is the probability that she is a permanent resident of Estonia. To be 
considered a resident of Estonia, a person’s residency index has to be above the threshold of 
0.7 (ibid). 
In press releases SE promotes the RI-model as “reflect[ing] reality more accurately” 
(SE, 2016a). The change in methods also made it necessary to address the software issue as 
the RI-model “discovered” many EU immigrants whose previous country of residence was 
unknown (interview SE March 2016). Hence, Estonian statisticians claim – in the language of 
metrological realism – that the new methodology better accounts for “immigration of 
European citizens, which the previous methodology reflected to a smaller extent” (SE, 
2016b).  
This framing of the RI-model as “more accurate” indicates that statisticians assume an 
objective, external reality that can be used as a yardstick to assess their methods in terms of 
“accuracy” and to hierarchize between them. This hierarchization permits statisticians to 
assemble migration into a single, coherent reality. This illustrates Annemarie Mol’s (2002: 
47) observation that “if two objects that go under the same name clash, in practice one of 
them will be privileged over the other.” In the following we describe how this orchestration of 
different versions of the real is done in practice through the concepts of “over-”  and “under-
coverage”. 
In Estonia the old methodology for migration statistics was problematized after the 
2011 census as entailing a significant under-coverage of emigration. The census questionnaire 
included a question on emigration of any household members. Results suggested that more 
people emigrated than previously calculated with the cohort component method on the basis 
of RR-data. By diagnosing an under-coverage in the RR-based methodology, the census was 
elevated to the position of the superior method (Tiit, 2012). However, since the census is only 
conducted once per decade, it is unable to provide a methodology for SE’s annual migration 
statistics. Hence, statisticians developed the RI-model and subsequently declared this new 
methodology as the new gold standard. An article published in SE’s house journal assesses, 
for instance, the registration behavior of people in Estonia, based on a comparison between 
RR-data and calculations with the RI-model. The article stresses that “in the case of a 
discrepancy between the two datasets, the data according to the index, and not the population 
register, are considered accurate” (Meres 2017, 72). 
The establishment of hierarchies between different statistical methods highlights, 
however, that over- and under-coverage do not express a relation to an objective, external 
migration reality. They rather express relations between different versions of migration that 
have been produced with different methods. The under-coverage of emigration events by the 
RR-based methodology only emerged as a problem when a second methodology – the 2011 
census – was brought into play. Hence, the diagnosed under-coverage in the RR-data 
expresses a relation to census data and not to an external reality. This relational character of 
over- and under-coverage shows that there is no objective migration reality that could provide 
a standard to assess the quality of statistical methods since any migration reality only exists in 
relation to the practices and methods that are used to know it.  
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However, the invocation of over- or under-coverage permits statisticians to establish 
hierarchies between different versions of migration that have been produced with different 
methods. This hierarchization is important groundwork for the next steps that are needed to 
comply with the convention of common-sense-realism that there can only be one, more or less 
coherent migration reality: the discontinuation of any method that has been established as 
inferior and the compression of essentially different versions of migration into one time 
series. All that remains is a significant increase in migration events in 2015, a ‘jump’ in the 
time series of Estonia’s migration statistics which may be, if interpreted carefully, attributed 
to a change in methodology (Herm and Poulain, 2012). 
 The crucial point concerning the GMFIA is that changes in methodology within one 
NSI, as well as the usage of different methodologies across NSIs, imply that migration is not 
comparable across time and space (UNECE, 2014). The analyst is essentially dealing with 
different versions of migration. For what migration is – and how large or small in terms of 
numbers – “depends on how ‘it’ is being done in practice” (Law and Lien, 2012: 366). 
Depending on the methodology used, emigration from Estonia can be a “yes” to the question 
“has any close relative of yourself or of a member of your household […] left Estonia in 2000 
or later and is currently living abroad?” (Tiit, 2014: 85); 2), a recorded emigration event in the 
population register or a residency index value of less than 0,7 in two consecutive years. And 
as described in the previous section, other NSIs use different methodologies like an estimation 
method based on administrative data (CSB Latvia) or a sample survey (ONS). These are all 
different methods that enact not only different accounts, but different versions of migration. 
The IOM’s GMFIA ignores all these methodological differences by compressing essentially 
different versions of migration into one “world migration map”. 
 
Transparency – the (unfulfilled) promise of metadata 
This section attends to metadata to elaborate two more practices for the production of 
strategic ignorance: deflection and sanitizing. The purpose of metadata is to explain the 
production process of datasets to their users. Ideally, metadata should comprise all ‘additional 
descriptions necessary to understand data’ (Edwards et al., 2011: 671). Hence, principle 15 of 
the European Statistics Code of Practice calls on statisticians to present “statistics and the 
corresponding metadata […] in a form that facilitates proper interpretation and meaningful 
comparisons” (Eurostat, 2011: 8). Thus, the provision of metadata is set as a proxy for 
accountability and transparency of official statistics. This “data-driven transparency” 
conceives of metadata as pure, pre-interpretative information that is produced and 
communicated free of any interest and that can therefore elucidate the production process 
(Birchall, 2015). Yet, in this section we show that metadata fall short of this promise. To this 
end we trace the chain of references to metadata on the data underpinning the GMFIA. 
As noted above, the GMFIA provides only scarce information about the data 
informing its visualization. All we can learn from a description below the map is that “the 
underlying data for the map was published by the UNDESA in 2015.”12 Moreover, the app 
does not provide any information on how this data was translated into a visualization. In this 
way the establishment of an equivalence between emigration events in countries of origin and 
numbers on the stocks of immigrants in host countries is omitted. Users can only learn about 
                                                 
12
 Quoted from: http://www.iom.int/world-migration (accessed 07 October 2017). 
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this decisive methodological move if they follow the link to an external webpage and read the 
documentation of UNDESA’s International migrant stock 2015 dataset.13 In this way the 
GMFIA suppresses information that would be essential for “proper interpretation and 
meaningful comparisons” (Eurostat, 2011: 8) of the provided data. 
This method for producing strategic ignorance is based on the deflection of any 
knowledge that may destabilize the enactment of migration as a quantifiable reality. 
Deflection shows that metadata are shaped by institutional interests and agendas. Moreover, 
the strategy of deflection illustrates that data-driven transparency places the burden of tracing 
the origin of data and assessing its quality on the individual user whose “experience of agency 
in this respect is reliant upon technological competence” (Birchall, 2015: 190), most notably 
statistical literacy. In this way data-driven transparency facilitates the production of strategic 
ignorance about the known limits of quantifying migration.  
If users do however retrieve relevant metadata from the two linked UN-webpages, 
they will discover that information provided on the sources of UNDESA’s dataset is generic 
and incomplete. For Estonia and Latvia, for instance, there is the same text block: “Based on 
official estimates of international migration, and estimates derived as the difference between 
overall population growth and natural increase through 2015” (UNDESA, 2017: 27 and 46). 
This information does certainly not offer all “additional descriptions necessary to understand 
[the provided] data” (Edwards et al., 2011: 671). It rather illustrates that metadata tend to be 
partial and subject to data friction.  
The production of strategic ignorance through data friction may also occur as a field 
effect through non-transfer of knowledge from one epistemic community to the next. In case 
of the field of migration management there is for instance a non-transfer of knowledge from 
the field of official statistics because statisticians also mobilize metadata as a strategy of 
sanitizing. During our research we frequently encountered metadata that were outdated and 
incomplete. We also encountered metadata reports where whole sections had obviously been 
copied and pasted either from reports of previous years or even from metadata reports of other 
NSIs. This indicates that statisticians do not invest as much time and care in the provision of 
metadata as the notion of data-driven transparency suggests. 
One factor that explain this is production pressure. Although many statisticians 
describe metadata as “absolutely crucial”, some of them also regard the task of producing it as 
“a drag [burden]”; while others note that “it is crucial to have it, if only I did not need to do 
[write] it” (Field notes, Turkstat November 2015). Statisticians are often struggling to meet 
deadlines of a tight annual production schedule and often lack the time needed for compiling 
comprehensive metadata (Interview SE, June 2016).  
There is however another reason for incomplete metadata: rather than making the 
statistical production process fully transparent to users, statisticians use metadata to sanitize 
accounts of the statistical production process of any messy moments that may compromise the 
authority of the published figures or their producers. This is possible because metadata are 
potentially infinite as statisticians emphasize: “In methodology it is always a question of 
details, so the question is how deep do you go into the details when you describe the 
methodology? … who will read 5000 steps in SPSS?” (Interview SE, March 2016). Hence, 
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precisely because they have to be selective, statisticians can provide metadata in a way that 
sanitizes the statistical production process of any messy, potentially compromising moments 
in order to represent it as a methodologically rigorous, replicable procedure. No metadata on 
Estonia’s migration statistics mentions, for instance, the issues with the computer software 
discussed earlier, despite the massive under-coverage of immigration events implicated by it. 
Likewise, the issue of unregistered emigration is only mentioned in metadata from 2016 
onwards to justify the introduction of the RI-model, but not in metadata of previous years. 
 The reason for this production of strategic ignorance through sanitizing resides in 
what Alain Desrosières describes as the “metadata paradox.” He likens the provision of 
metadata to the exhibition of the scaffolding of a building and concludes that “as with great 
monuments, exhibiting these ‘scaffoldings’ may […] blur if not the beauty at least the 
argumentative efficiency of the factual evidence consisting in the publication of a plain, bare 
figure” (Desrosières, 2009: 317). This explains why the politics of expertise in the field of 
official statistics also feature the production of strategic ignorance. This results in a partial 
non-transfer of knowledge about problems of quantifying migration from the field of official 
statistics to the field of migration management. 
In sum, our analysis suggests that the production of strategic ignorance through 
metadata is distributed between different professional fields. It confirms that the demands, 
(informal) rules, established procedures and protocols of different professional and 
intellectual fields of practice shape how and what kind of ignorance and nonknowledge are 
produced by the actors of a field of practice (Kleinman and Suryanarayanan, 2013). In official 
statistics metadata reports function as means of purification that sanitize the statistical 
production process of any aspects that might compromise the authority of the published 
figures. We regard this production of strategic unknowns as an effect of the field of official 
statistics where the epistemic community of statisticians has to perform according to the 
expectations of users to secure legitimacy and funding. And many users of official statistics 
are primarily interested in numerical facts they can rely on for decision making, rather than 
lengthy descriptions of methodological issues that cast doubts on the reliability of the 
published figures (interview SE, March 2016). This is why sanitizing metadata has become 
part of the “epistemic culture of nonknowledge” (Böschen et al., 2010) of the field of official 
statistics, just as the deflection of knowledge about the known limits of quantifying migration 
constitutes a central element in the epistemic culture of nonknowledge of the field of 
migration management. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has shown how the GMFIA enacts migration as a single, coherent and measurable 
reality by producing strategic ignorance about the known limits of quantifying migration 
through four different practices: omission, compression, deflection and sanitizing. To 
conclude, we discuss the implications of this enactment of migration for the ‘politics of 
international migration management’ (Geiger and Pécoud, 2010).  
With Lindsey McGoey we understand the production of ignorance about the known limits of 
quantifying migration as strategic in a twofold sense. On the one hand, individual actors like 
the IOM produce this ignorance to increase the legitimacy and force of their expertise as a 
way to improve their position in the field of migration management. In case of the GMFIA the 
strategic nature of the production of ignorance is highlighted by the fact that, since 2015, the 
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IOM maintains a Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC) which hosts various 
‘experts’ who occasionally highlight the known limits of quantifying migration (Ardittis and 
Laczko, 2017).14 This shows that the enactment of migration as a precisely measurable reality 
through devices like the GMFIA does not contradict the showcasing of the ‘ever-
perfectionability’ (Rocha de Siqueira, 2016) of existing data practices for quantifying 
migration. For what is questioned by the experts of the GMDAC is not the measurability of 
migration, but the adequacy of existing methods available for this task. The continued 
relevance of numerical evidence as a source of expertise is in turn highlighted by the 
mobilization of statistical facts by the IOM and other stakeholders in the field of migration 
management who invoke the authority of numbers to justify particular projects of migration 
management. One example is the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Program 
(AVRR), which constitutes “a core activity of IOM” in Greece.15 The IOM’s AVRR Annual 
Report cites, for instance, the number of “131,847 refugees and migrants” that have entered 
Greece in 2016 to diagnose an “imminent need for AVRR information and assistance 
throughout Greece” (IOM Greece, 2017: 21). 
Yet, the production of ignorance is also strategic insofar as it secures the doxa of the field of 
migration management, most notably the belief that migration is something that can be 
ordered according to certain policy objectives. In this context, the production of ignorance 
about the known limits of quantifying migration emerges as the combined effect of different 
professional fields of practice. Whereas statisticians tend to provide metadata in a way that 
does not compromise the authority of the published figures, actors of the field of migration 
management have ample reason to ignore any knowledge that may destabilize the enactment 
of migration as a measurable, orderable reality. Indeed, to tolerate any knowledge that enacts 
migration as a multiple, messy reality would cast doubts on the possibility to manage it. For 
what is difficult to measure is certainly difficult to manage. 
This is why metrological realism and its enactment of migration as a definite, singular reality 
emerge as one of the central epistemic pillars of the migration management paradigm. Besides 
providing the evidence base for the very viability of migration management, metrological 
realism permits advocates of migration management to present their policy recipes as 
universal ‘solutions’ that can be applied in any context world-wide. In this way metrological 
realism permits advocates of migration management to marginalize alternative policy options 
like the open borders approach (Pecoud and de Guchteneire, 2007) which, rather than 
ordering migration according to policy objectives of nation-states, envisages the self-
regulation of migration. 
Moreover, metrological realism reduces migration to a series of precisely measurable, 
unidirectional flows. What gets erased by this enactment of migration is the irreducible 
heterogeneity and singularity of migratory projects and movements (Tazzioli, 2015) and the 
elusive, pluri-focal character of migrants’ often ‘fragmented journeys’ (Collyer, 2010). In this 
way metrological realism wipes out the subjective moment of migration. This permits 
advocates of migration management to ignore that ‘migrants have a will of their own, one that 
lies outside of the hands of those who wish to control them’ (Sharma, 2009: 469). Hence, 
metrological realism supports the authoritarian potential of the migration management 
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 With the Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC) the IOM tries to become an 
‘epistemic authority’ (Geuss, 2001: 38) in the field of migration management that spearheads 
attempts to improve data on migration.  
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(Accessed on 30 August 2018). 
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paradigm which is full of prescriptions of how migrants should be and where they should 
move (or stay) (Geiger and Pécoud, 2010). 
The central role that metrological realism plays in sustaining the hegemony of migration 
management raises a crucial question: how to challenge this epistemic cornerstone of the 
migration management paradigm? A critique of particular migration numbers as inaccurate or 
inflated is certainly counterproductive. While such number games do exist, as the double-
count of unauthorised border-crossers by Frontex on the height of the ‘migration crisis’ 
illustrates (Sigona, 2015), such a critique ultimately reaffirms the epistemological register of 
metrological realism. What is required is a critique of metrological realism itself, and the 
related production of strategic ignorance about the known limits of quantifying migration. To 
paraphrase Robert Proctor: If the power and persuasiveness of migration management rest, to 
a large extent, on the production of ignorance about the known limits of quantifying 
migration, then dismantling this power ‘may require the reintroduction of bodies of ignorance 
– hence impotence – in that realm’ (Proctor, 2008: 22). This is the research agenda that we 
have tried to initiate in this article by highlighting some of the manifold issues that haunt 
existing attempts to quantify migration. Ultimately migration emerges as a ghostly, elusive 
and slippery reality that is much less measurable and manageable than the IOM and its 
GMFIA suggest. Some of the challenges and issues statisticians encounter in their efforts to 
‘measure’ migration might indeed be an expression of the autonomy of migration (Mezzadra, 
2011; Scheel, 2013), that is, the moments of uncontrollability and excess that migrations show 
in relation to ever more labored efforts to manage them. 
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